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RECENT CASES
civil commitment as a proper exercise of the state's police power?80 If the ratio-
nale of James is correct, will the exercise of fifth amendment rights to suppress
the alleged addict's case history create difficulties of proof that will emasculate
the certification proceeding? If Miranda is applicable to commitment proceed-
ings for addicts, should its safeguards be extended to insanity commitment
proceedings where an individual may lose his freedom of action, but where no
taint of criminality attends his confinement? If an addict proves that he would
receive superior treatment from a private physician, must he nonetheless be
committed?
8 '
The preceding policy questions emphasize the complexity of the task of
developing a civil proceeding for the compulsory commitment of narcotic addicts
which is at once constitutional and practicable.
KENNETH D. WEISS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ONE YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT To BE
ELIGIBLE FOR STATE WELFARE: A DENIAL OF BOTH EQUAL PROTECTION AND
FREEDOM OF TRAVEL
Defendant, the Commissioner of Welfare for the state of Connecticut,
denied plaintiff's application for assistance under Aid to Dependent Children'
on November 1, 1966, for the sole reason that she had not met the statutory one
year residence requirement. 2 Until September, 1966, plaintiff had been receiving
80. A persuasive argument that involuntary commitment of narcotic addicts is not
justified on the basis of existing knowledge about addicts, and methods of treatment is
presented by Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 405
(1967).
81. See A. Lindesmith, The Addict and the Law 270-77, 290-94 (1965).
1. Social Security Act, tit. IV, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09
(1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-06 (Supp. I, 1965).
2. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 17-2d (1965):
"When any person comes into this state without visible means of support for
the immediate future and applies for aid to dependent children under chapter 301
or general assistance under part I of chapter 308 within one year from his arrival,
such person shall be eligible only for temporary aid or care until arrangements are
made for his return, provided ineligibility for aid to dependent children shall not
continue beyond the maximum federal residence requirement."
As impemented by 1 Conn. Welfare Man. ch. II, § 219.1.
1. Persons or families who arrive in Connecticut without specific employment.
2. Those arriving without regular income or resources sufficient to enable the
family to be self-supporting in accordance with Standards of Public Assis-
tance.
3. "Immediate future" means within three months after arriving in Connecticut.
NOTE: Support from relatives or friends, or from a public, private, or
voluntary agency for three months after arrival will not satisfy the re-
quirements of the law, which relates to self-support rather than to depen-
dency.
And also implemented by id. § 219.2.
In accord with the above, the regulations further provide:
1. If the application for assistance is filed within one year after arrival in
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such assistance in Boston, Massachusetts, where she had resided prior to moving
to Connecticut. The plaintiff brought an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut,3 seeking a declaration that the Connecti-
cut statute was unconstitutional, an injunction to prevent its enforcement, and
payment of monies withheld. The court granted the relief sought. Held, the
statute is unconstitutional as applied since it "chills free travel" and also denies
equal protection of the law in violation of the fourteenth amendment by creating
classifications not reasonable in light of its purpose. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270
F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Nov.
13, 1967) (No. 813).
Plaintiff alleged her right to travel had been abridged by the statutory
requirement of one year residency in the state to qualify for welfare assistance.
The right to free travel has had a long history. It was specifically granted in the
Articles of Confederation: "[T]he people of each state shall have free ingress
and regress to and from any other state."4 Although not expressed in the Consti-
tution, the right was recognized early by the courts,3 and includes both inter-
state6 and internationa 7 travel. In 1837, the Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that the commerce clause applies to the right of free travel on the ground
that "persons are not the subject of commerce."18 Twelve years later, in a 5-4
decision, the Supreme Court9 accepted the proposition that persons could be the
subject of commerce, and held state taxes on passengers arriving from foreign
ports invalid under the commerce clause. 10 In the case of Crandall v. Nevada,'"
in 1867, the Supreme Court held that a tax imposed on all persons leaving the
state by commercial vehicle did not itself institute any regulation of commerce
of a national character or which had an unfavorable operation over the whole
Connecticut, the applicant must establish that he was self-supporting upon
arrival and for the succeeding three months thereafter; or
2. If the application for assistance is filed within one year after arrival in
Connecticut, the applicant must clearly establish that he came to Connecti-
cut with a bona fide job offer; or
3. If the application for assistance is filed within one year after arrival in
Connecticut, the applicant must establish that he sought employment and
had sufficient resources to sustain his family for the period during which a
person with his skill would normally be without employment while
actively seeking work. Personal resources to sustain his family for a
period of three months is considered sufficient. Those who come to Con-
necticut for seasonal employment such as work in tobacco or short term
farming are not deemed to have moved with the intent of establishing
residence in Connecticut. Connecticut Welfare Manual.
3. The action was brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2881, 2884.
4. U.S. Art. of Confed. art. IV.
5. Corfield v. Coryell, 6. F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
6. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
7. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958) ; Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S.
500, 505-06 (1964); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1965).
8. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 135 (1837).
9. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
10. See Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical
Assistance Programs, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 567, 584-85 (1966).
11. 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
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country, and hence it did not violate the commerce clause.-2 The Court, however,
ruled the tax unconstitutional as a violation of the right to travel freely.13 The
Court reasoned that this right was necessary for the federal government to carry
on its work,14 since, if a state could prevent a person from traveling, it could
prevent persons from going to federal offices and thus destroy the functioning of
the federal government. 15 The Supreme Court, in Henderson v. New York,-
once again resolved a free travel issue using the commerce clause. The statute
under attack required a shipmaster to post a bond for each passenger in order
to protect the city in the event that a passenger had to be supported by city
aid.17 A unanimous court held the statute violated the commerce clause since
only Congress could regulate incoming passengers from other states and coun-
tries.' 8 In Edwards v. California,9 a California law making it a crime to trans-
port an indigent into California was held unconstitutional as a violation of free-
dom of travel. Five of the judges, relying on the commerce clause, held the
exclusion of paupers as a moral pestilence was not a valid justification for
sustaining interference with interstate commerce.2 0 The four concurring judges,
relying on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,
suggested that the right to pass freely from state to state is an incident of na-
tional citizenship, and a state can not impinge on this right solely to protect
its treasury.2' Thus, although courts have differed as to the basis of the right
of freedom of travel, the existence of the right has never been denied 2 2 Freedom
to travel outside of the United States has recently been analogized to the free-
doms of the first amendment, thus giving it the preferred status accorded to
such rights as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
23
The Connecticut statute was intended to discourage indigents seeking
welfare from entering the state. The welfare regulations implementing the statute
set up three categories: indigents with a cash stake, those with a job offer, and
12. Id. The concurring opinion of Clifford, J., suggested otherwise. Id. at 49.
13. Id. at 43-44.
14. Id.
15. Id. The Court, in United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920), tried to limit
Crandall to free travel for governmental purposes.
16. 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
17. Id. at 268.
18. Id. at 274.
19. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
20. Id. at 176-77.
21. Id. at 177 (Concurring opinion of Douglas, J.).
22. United States v. Guest, 283 U.S. 745, 759 (1966).
23. Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); see also Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1965).
It has been suggested that "there are a variety of devices . . . which enable the courts
to express the constitutionally mandated preference for freedom of speech and thought.
Among these are the clear and present danger test; narrowing of the presumption of con-
stitutionality; strict construction of statutes to avoid limitation of first amendment free-
doms; the prohibitions against prior restraint and subsequent punishment; relaxation of the
requirement of standing to sue where first amendment issues are involved; and generally
higher standards of procedural due process where these freedoms are in jeopardy. Not one,
but the sum total of these-and more-make up the preferred position concept. "McKay,
The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1182, 1184 (1959).
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those with neither. Only indigents falling into the last category were required to
fulfill the residence requirement.2 4
Violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution by creating classifications not reasonable in light of
the statute's purpose was the second ground relied upon by the court in the in'
stant ease. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 25 was
adopted in order to insure recently freed Negroes the full protection of the law.20
It has not been restricted to merely assuring the protection of the law, but has
also been interpreted to guarantee equal substantive rights.2 7 "(T]he equal pro-
tection of the law is a pledge of the protection of equal laws,"2 8 and the clause
has been extended to all citizens,2 9 aliens 0 and corporations.3 ' Since the four-
teenth amendment protects an individual from the actions of a state but not from
those of another individual,3 2 there must be "state action"33 in order to invoke
its protection.34 Recognizing that any classification has to create inequality, for
classification itself means inequality,85 the courts have interpreted the fourteenth
amendment to prohibit only those classifications which are unreasonable8" in
light of the statute's purpose.3 7 In general, if any state of facts could reasonably
sustain the classification, courts have assumed that such facts existed when the
statute was enacted.38 Since a statute ordinarily is presumed to be constitutional,
the burden of showing that the classification is arbitrary, and does not in fact
rest upon a reasonable basis, falls on the person challenging the classification. 0
It has been held that showing a legislature has not done everything possible to
cure an evil will not prove that the statute is arbitrary, for the legislature may
attack a problem in piece-meal fashion.40 The application of these rules of rea-
sonableness depends upon the subject matter of the legislation. When dealing
24. The Conn. Stat. is set forth in footnote 2 supra.
25. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
States where in they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
26. Tressman & Tenbrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341
(1949). See also R. Harris, The Quest for Equality, 57 (1960).
27. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
28. Id. at 369.
29. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 35, 80 (1873).
30. "ick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
31. County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R. R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
32. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (Emphasis added.)
33. See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (1960).
34. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
35. Atchison, Topeka & S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899).
36. Gulf Colorado & S.F.Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165 (1897).
37. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
38. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas. Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
39. Id.
40. Mo. K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904).
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with statutes pertaining to railroads,41 securities42 or taxes,4 3 courts have gener-
ally accepted the legislature's decisions of what are necessary and reasonable
classifications. 44 On the other hand, statutes infringing on personal or individual
rights4" and those basing classification on color, race4 6 or nationality,4 7 have
been subjected to higher standards.48 Courts have not presumed the constitu-
tionality of statutes with classifications based on race, creed or nationality.49
Since the purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to protect the rights of
freed Negroes," ° it was natural that courts used the amendment to invalidate
classifications based solely on color.51 It has been stated that in the absence of
a strong overriding public interest "racial classifications . . . are reduced to an
invidious discrimination." 52 Some Supreme Court justices have gone so far as to
state that any classification based on color or race is "invidious per se."'53 This
interpretation of equality was used when the Court overruled the "equal but
separate" doctrine,5 4 holding that separate facilities for Negroes and whites were
"inherently unequal."5 5 Similar high standards have been applied to classifica-
tions based on nationality.56 A statute, valid on its face, has not satisfied the
fourteenth amendment if it is applied with nationality as the basis of classifica-
tion.57 Courts begin "with the proposition that only the most exceptional cir-
cumstances can excuse discrimination on the basis [of nationality] in the face
of the equal protection clause ... .,,5
Courts have recently expressed the view that classification based on wealth
is to be treated as similar to that based on race or color. Mr. Justice Jackson in
his concurring opinion in Edwards v. California59 stated that "the mere being
without funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed,
or color."' 60 In another case, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,61 a poll tax
was held unconstitutional because it discriminated against the poor without a
valid justification. The court stated that, "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth
or property like those of race . . are traditionally disfavored."
62
41. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 368 (1940).
42. Hall v. Giger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
43. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
44. Tressman & Tenbrock, supra note 26; see R. Harris, suprq note 26.
45. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
46. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954).
47. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
48. Tressman & Tenbrock, supra note 26, at 353-56.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
53. Id. at 198 (concurring opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J.).
54. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
55. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'r, 334 U.S. 410, 425 (1948).
57. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
58. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
59. 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941).
60. Id. at 184-185.
61. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
62. Id. at 668.
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Courts also have set high standards in applying the equal protection clause
where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted.63 "[T]he usual presumption
supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given... to . . . free-
doms secured by the First Amendment .... [I] t is the character of the right,
not the limitation, which determines what standard governs." 4 The standards
applicable to fundamental rights and freedoms have been used, for example, in
cases involving freedom of speech, 5 freedom of assembly,0 voting rights, 7 and
the right to work.68 Once a statute has been categorized as impinging on an indi-
vidual or natural right, it does not satisfy the equal protection clause merely by
having a classification reasonably related to the purpose of the act.00 The pur-
pose itself must have a strong justification, and courts have not assumed the
existence of facts which would make such classifications reasonable.7° Even the
degree of discrimination has been held immaterial when fundamental rights are
involved.
7 1
In the instant case, the Connecticut statute72 was held to chill free travel7a
and to violate equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.74 After tracing the various bases for the right of free travel, the
court accepted without question the existence of the right: "In short, whatever
it's source, the right to travel exists .... "75 The court considered any discourage-
ment or chilling as an abridgement of this right,7 relying on United States v.
Guest,"7 Edwards and an analogy to first amendment cases for support of this
proposition. The court, in the instant case, interpreted the words "impede" and
"oppress," as used by the Court in Guest,78 to mean that the discouragement
of interstate travel is also forbidden.70 The court supported its statement by
emphasizing that the statute in Edwards penalized the sponsor of the indigent
rather than the indigent himself.80 Therefore the statute in Edwards did not
63. Id. at 670.
64. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
65. Id.
66. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
67. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
68. Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
69. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
70. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
71. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
72. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 17-2d quoted supra note 2.
73. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 336 (1967) [hereinafter cited as instant
case].
74. Id. at 338.
75. Id. at 336.
76. See, Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Wolf v. Selective Service, 372
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
77. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
78. "[Ilf . . . the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right
of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that right, then,
whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes a proper object
of the federal law. . . ." Id. at 760.
79. Instant case at 336.
80. Id. at 336. Thus the freedom of travel for an indigent was comparable to the right
of a Negro to buy land in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). In that case a party
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proscribe the exercise of the indigent's right to travel, but only discouraged it to
the extent that a person aiding him would be penalized. The court also relied on
the first amendment cases:
Further support for the proposition that the right of interstate travel
also encompasses the right to be free of discouragement of interstate
movement may be found by analogy to cases proscribing actions which
have a chilling effect on First Amendment rights.81
The defendant had contended that the plaintiff was not discouraged from moving
into nor settling in Connecticut as long as she did not seek welfare benefits,82
thus presenting the question of whether conditioning benefits on the non-exercise
of constitutionally guaranteed rights abridges the right. The court employed the
solution used in "conditional benefit" cases involving first amendment rights.
8 3
For example, it relied on Sherbert v. Verner,8 4 in which conditioning the receipt
of unemployment insurance on the taking of any available jobs, even if such a
job required work on the recipient's day of worship, was held to impede the
freedom of religion and thus was unconstitutional.8 5 In the instant case, the court
held that "denying to the plaintiff even a gratuitous benefit, because of her exer-
cise of her constitutional right, effectively impedes the exercise of that right.2
8 6
An essential step in the court's reasoning was the proposition that the right to
travel includes the right to establish a residence.8 7 A residence requirement does
not inhibit, impede or chill the actual crossing of a state line. What is interfered
with is the right to remain in the newly entered state. By including the right to
remain within the right to travel, the court eliminated any possible distinction
between the two rights. The court thus concluded that "because [the statute]
has a chilling effect on the right to travel, it is unconstitutional. 88
The court held the statute, in addition to abridging the right of travel,
denied the plaintiff equal protection of the laws. 89 In order to determine whether
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was violated, the
court did not presume the constitutionality of the statute, but placed on the
defendant the burden of proving that the classifications created in the statute
were reasonable in light of the statute's purpose.90 The defendant did not prove
that there would be in the long run less of a drain on the treasury by the class
of indigents not required to reside in the state for one year than by those who
to a restrictive covenant was permitted to assert the rights of a Negro as a defense to an
action for breach of the contract by selling to the Negro.
81. Id. at 336.
82. Id. at 335.
83. See O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare With Strings Attached, 54 Calif.
L. Rev. 443 (1966).
84. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
85. Id. at 405-06.




90. Id., citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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had to meet the residence requirement.Y' The court therefore concluded that the
classifications were unreasonable,
The court in the instant case found the statute chilled free travel and thus
held it unconstitutional. The fact that a right has been abridged is not enough
to conclude that the abridgment is unconstitutional. It must first be shown that
the abridgment was unjustified, which requires a balancing of interests. Underly-
ing the decision in the instant case, although not completely expressed, was a
balancing between the state's interests and the individual's right to free travel.
The state was trying to protect its treasury and its social composition by restrict-
ing the ingress of indigents. The desire to limit the number of indigents in the
state can be given no weight in the balancing process, for this is an invalid pur-
pose. Mr. Justice Jackson in Edwards0 2 discussed this point and held that dis-
crimination on the basis of wealth was in violation of the principles underlying
the foundation of the country. The Edwards Court also held that prohibiting the
indigent's entrance into the state was not entitled to justification as a health
regulation, for indigents as such were not a "moral pestilence. " D3 Therefore the
court in the instant case, to determine justification, had to balance only the
,state's interest in protecting its treasury against the individual's right to travel.
The Court in Edwards suggested that a state does not have the right to protect
its treasury from the burden of a national problem, such as the plight of the indi-
gent, by isolating itself from the rest of the states.94 Since states must solve these
problems together, no state can isolate itself from national problems by prevent-
ing the ingress of indigents. Therefore when balancing the state's interest in
protecting its treasury against the right of an individual to travel freely, the right
of the individual is clearly to be placed above that of the state. The state's inter-
est alone cannot justify abridging the right of freedom of travel,
There is a second reason why the state's interest in protecting its treasury
should not justify an abridgment of the individual's freedom of travel. Since the
court in the instant case has treated this right as a preferred freedom, the state
must have a stronger justification to abridge it than would be needed if lesser
rights were involved. To hold that the protection of the state treasury justifies
the violation of a preferred right would also justify interference with other
"lesser rights." A state's power to violate constitutionally guaranteed rights
would thus be almost unlimited, for the protection of individual rights frequently
is expensive for a state.
The court does not reach the really critical equal protection question: Is a
statute which discriminates solely on the basis of wealth, without justification,
constitutional in light of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment? The court, after a thorough examination of the constitutionality of a
residence test, decided the case not on the invidious discrimination created by
91. Id. at 337-338.
92. 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1942) (concurring opinion).
93. Id. at 174-75, 177.
94. Id. at 173-74.
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the statute, but rather on the constitutionality of the application of the resi-
dence test. In other words, the court decided that the classification within the
statute was unconstitutional. If the statute did not have these classifications but
required all applicants to have had resided in the state for one year, the
court's decision would not have held it unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds. The court agreed with and followed Edwards v. California5 to the
extent that it found the purpose invalid, the justification inadequate, and the
right to travel abridged: "Here, as [in Edwards], the burden on the state
treasury does not justify an enactment with an invalid purpose." 96 While the
Court in Edwards invalidated the statute on this ground, the court in Thomp-
son did not. It abandoned its argument, assumed arguendo the validity of the
statute's purpose and decided the case on the narrow grounds of the particu-
lar application of the statute. The purpose of the Connecticut statute was
solely to discourage indigents, who would need welfare assistance, from enter-
ing the state. The justification for this discrimination was the protection of
the state treasury.97 Thus the court was presented with a statute intended by
the legislature to discriminate against a class of people, indigents, without a
valid justification. This is an invidious discrimination." The court reached this
point but failed to declare the statute unconstitutional on this ground.
An aspect of this type of welfare problem, not considered in Thompson, is
the implication of the use of federal funds in the welfare program. Federal stat-
utes99 provide for federal financial aid to state welfare programs. These statutes
allow a state to set residence requirements, within certain time limits, and still be
eligible for federal financial aid. 10 0 It has been suggested that these statutes
violate the equal protection of the law implicit in the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.' 0 This equal protection argument is similar to one under the
fourteenth amendment discussed above. The federal action invoking the fifth
amendment is the providing of financial aid, which is analogous to state action
invoking the fourteenth amendment.102 Where there has been racial discrimina-
tion in federal programs the fifth amendment has been applied. 0 3 But the fifth
95. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941),
96. Instant case at 337.
97. This distinction between purpose and justification was confused in parts of the
decision; e.g., "the purpose of § 17-2d [is] to discourage entry by those who come needing
relief.. . " Id. at 337. And "the purpose of § 17-2d is to protect its fisc .... " Id. at 336-37.
The court must have meant that the purpose was to discourage the entrance of indigents.
Otherwise its conclusion that "the burden on the state treasury does not justify an enact-
ment with an invalid purpose" would not make sense. Id. at 337. A burden on the state
treasury does not justify an enactment to protect the state treasury.
98. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 181 (1941) (Douglas, Jackson, J.J.,
concurring).
99. For a list of statutes see Harvith, supra note 10.
100. Id.
101. Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 Albany "L. Rev.
210 (1967).
102. See Lewis, supra note 33.
103. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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amendment has not been limited to racial discrimination'0 4 and could be applied
in the present case.
The court in the instant case treated freedom of travel as a preferred free-
dom. The case adopts the position of Mr. Justice Douglas in Edwards, developed
more recently in the passport cases. In Edwards, Mr. Justice Douglas argued
that the right to travel is a right of national citizenship, 10 5 fundamental in na-
tional character,l0 6 and therefore deserves a more protected position in the con-
stitutional system than does movement of goods. 10 7 Mr. Justice Jackson, in a
separate concurring opinion, also considered the right to be a "fundamental"
one:
This court should, however, hold squarely that it is a privilege of citi-
zenship of the United States, protected from state abridgment, to enter
any state of the Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the estab-
lishment of permanent residence therein and for gaining resultant
citizenship thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it
means nothing. 08
The preferred position of the right to travel was further developed in Kent v.
Dulles'0 9 and Apetheker v. Secretary of State."10 The Court in Kent recog-
nized that because free travel is a basic freedom, powers which curtail or di-
lute the right must be narrowly construed."' The Apetheker decision clearly
raised this right to a preferred position by analogizing the right to that of free
speech and association: "Freedom of movement is considered the very essence
of free society . . . [and,] once curtailed, . . . all other rights suffer." 112 Both
passport cases dealt with freedom of association and beliefs, and international
travel. Therefore they can not be relied upon to reveal the actual position to
be given to the freedom of interstate travel. Zemel v. Rusk," 8 a third pass-
port case, dealt with the denial of a passport to a person requesting one to
visit Cuba. The majority upheld the validity of prohibiting travel to Cuba on
the grounds of national defense, and did not discuss the preferred position of
the right to travel. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, clearly stated and ex-
panded the position that the right to travel is a preferred right, albeit peri-
pheral, under the first amendment.114 Restrictive legislation must be narrowly
drawn,"l5 and unnecessarily broad standards can not be used to invade the
area of the protected freedom." 6
104. Harvith, supra note 94.
105. 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1942).
106. Id. at 178.
107. Id. at 177.
108. Id. at 183 (Jackson, J. concurring),
109. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
110. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
111. 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
112. 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964),
113. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
114. Id. at 24 (dissent by Douglas, J.).
115. Id. at 25.
116. Id. at 26.
RECENT CASES
Thompson v. Shapiro must take its place among the growing number of
recent cases affirming the basic rights of welfare recipients. In Parrish v. Civil
Service Comm'n of Cal.117 early morning surprise inspections of the welfare re-
cipient's home by the welfare department were held unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the recipient's right to privacy. In Iowa, Collins v. State Board of Social
Welfare"18 held the welfare department could not discriminate against large fami-
lies. In addition to Thompson, there have been at least seven other actions to
contest residence requirements for welfare assistance. 119 In Green v. Department
of Public Welfare, 20 a statute requiring one year residence for welfare eligibility
was held invalid as a violation of the equal protection clause. The case was
decided on lack of justification and the unreasonableness of a one year period
without welfare assistance rather than on the narrow classification
ground employed in Thompson. The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia used both equal protection and free travel grounds to hold a
one year residence requirement for welfare unconstitutional.' 2' Since the purpose
of the welfare statute was to help the applicant and the recipient attain self-
support, a residency requirement created a classification unreasonable in light
of this purpose. To deny assistance to a six-month resident, while providing it
for a one-year resident, was held to deny the former equal protection of the
laws. The concurring opinion stated that to deter the indigent from settling in
the District of Columbia violated the indigent's right to travel freely. A pre-
liminary injunction has been issued in Smith v. Reynolds, 22 restraining the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from denying public assistance to the plaintiff
because she failed to meet the state residence requirement. A three judge court
has also been convened in Waggoner v. Gunderman12 3 to decide a similar ques-
tion.
It appears that one year residency requirements for welfare assistance will
be held unconstitutional since there is no valid justification for depriving an
individual of assistance for such a long period. There will be many more cases
dealing with the problem of residency requirements. Because of the preferred
position given to the freedom of travel and the recent concern for the poor, the
decisions will be similar to that of Thompson. If there is no federal legislation
117. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d 223 (1967).
118. Collins v. State Bd. of Soc. Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957).
119. Green v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967); Alexander v.
California Dep't of Soc. Welfare, Civ. No. 47041 (N.D. Cal., filed May 10, 1967); Smith v.
Reynolds, Civ. No. 42419 (E.D. Pa., June 1, 1967), 9 Welfare L. Bull. 10 (July 1967);
Waggoner v. Gunderman, Civ. No. 67-40 (W.D. Pa., Jan., 1967), 9 Welfare L. Bull. 10
(July, 1967); Harrel v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C., 1967); Barley v. Board of
Commnn, Civ. No. 1579-67 (D.D.C., filed June 20, 1967), 9 Welfare L. Bull. 10 (July 1967);
B. v. S., 5 Welfare L. Bull. 3 (Oct., 1966).
120. Green v. Dep't of Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del., 1967).
121. Harrel v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C., 1967).
122. Smith v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 42419 (E.D. Pa., 1967), 9 Welfare L. Bull. 10 (July,
1967).
123. 9 Welfare L. Bull. 10 (July, 1967).
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to clarify the federal laws which authorize states to enact residence requirements,
a direct attack on these federal statutes will probably be the only way to fin-
ally resolve the residency requirement problem.
ROBERT M. FEINSON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE SERVICEMAN'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
A SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL
Petitioner was convicted in two separate court-martials and sentenced to
confinement with forfeiture of two-thirds of his pay for six months. Prior to
trial, the petitioner had requested the appointment of legally qualified civilian
or military defense counsel. The request was denied. The court then appointed,
as defense counsel, an officer who was not legally trained but who had training
comparable to that of trial counsel as required by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, sections 827 and 828.1 After exhausting military appellate review, the
petitioner filed a writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court,
which was dismissed.2 Appeal was then taken to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the district court decision and held: The appointment of non-legally
trained counsel in a special court-martial was not violative of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel or of the fifth amendment right to a fair trial under the
due process clause. Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967).
The judicial system of the Army, Navy and Air Force is defined by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.8 The Code provides for a General Courts-
Martial, Special Courts-Martial and Summary Courts-Martial. 4 The officer in
a defendant's chain of command decides before which of the three courts a
defendant will be tried. The Courts-Martial jurisdictions are differentiated by
the extent of the punishment that may be applied to a convicted defendant. A
General Court-Martial may prescribe any punishment, including a penalty of
1. See 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964) which provides:
(a) For each general and special court-martial the authority convening the court
shall detail trial counsel and defense counsel, and such assistants as he con-
siders appropriate ...
(c) In the case of a special court-martial-
(1) if the trial counsel is qualified to act as counsel before a general court-
martial, the defense counsel detailed by the convening authority must be
a person similarly qualified; and
(2) if the trial counsel is a judge advocate, or a law specialist, or a member
of the bar of a Federal court or the highest court of a State, the de-
fense counsel detailed by the convening authority must be one of the
foregoing....
Id. § 838 provides:
(b) The accused has the right to be represented in his defense before a general or
special court-martial by civilian counsel if provided by him, or by military
counsel of his own selection if reasonably available, or by the defense counsel
detailed under Section 827 of this title (article 27). ...
2. 258 F. Supp. 967 (D. Kan. 1966).
3. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101-2771 (1964).
4. Id. § 816.
